RESEARCH
My research focuses on the role of interest groups, civil society organizations, and business actors in public policymaking, with a particular emphasis on lobbying, representation, and governance in the European Union and its member states.
I examine how organized interests interact with policymakers, how access and influence are distributed, and how these interactions shape policy processes and outcomes. Drawing on insights from public administration, public policy, political science, and organizational studies, I analyze both the strategies of interest groups and the institutional contexts in which they operate.
My work has been published in journals such as Journal of European Public Policy, European Union Politics, and Policy Sciences.
Publications in peer-reviewed Journals
Abstract: This article examines the relationship between business interest associations’ (BIAs’) governance configurations and their access to administrative officials and political heads of the European Union. We focus on how effective BIAs design their plenaries and boards to address the inclusiveness-efficiency tradeoff. By means of a qualitative comparative analysis, we find that most of the configurations related to administrative officials balance efficiency-inclusiveness tensions, one prioritizes inclusion while another focuses on efficiency. As for political heads, EU Commissioners seem to prioritize BIAs that successfully balance these contradictory poles while also paying attention to more inclusive BIAs.
Abstract: This article systematically examines how access of business groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to the executive branch of the European Union varies across political heads, civil servants, and an understudied yet critical intermediary figure of the executive branch: political advisers. Building upon exchange theory, we argue that the occurrence of a meeting between public officials and interest groups depends on information and legitimacy sought and offered by both types of actors, the public officials’ public exposure, and the interest groups’ lobbying strategies. The empirical analysis is focused on the executive body of the European Union (i.e., the European Commission). Our results show that, while political advisers and civil servants are more likely to meet with business groups than with NGOs, political heads are not biased in favor of any of these two groups.
Abstract: This article asks why public officials perceive some interest groups as influential for policy outcomes. Theoretically, we rely on resource exchange and behavioral approaches. Perceived influence of interest groups does not only follow from the policy capacities they bring to the table; it also relates to the extent to which public officials consider groups as policy insiders. Both effects are assumed to be conditional on advocacy salience, i.e., the number of stakeholders mobilized in each legislative proposal. We rely on a new dataset of 103 prominent interest groups involved in 28 legislative proposals passed between 2015 and 2016 at the European Union level. Our findings show that interest groups associated with high analytical and political capacities are perceived as more influential for final policy outcomes than other groups with less policy capacities. Yet, in policy issues with high advocacy salience, interest groups characterized by higher ‘insiderness’ are perceived as more influential among public officials.
Abstract: Interest groups are key intermediary actors that communicate societal interests and preferences to public officials. Given public officials’ reliance on interest groups’ input in public policy processes, it is essential to understand how groups establish policy positions and assess the democratic nature of this process. Focusing on the leadership perspective, this article examines how interest groups involve their membership base in the process of defining their policy positions. The article relies on qualitative data from interviews with the leaders of interest groups active at the EU level and the statutes of these organizations. The findings show that the nature of policy issues under discussion and unequal resources of members lead to biased membership involvement in policy position-taking. While leaders are aware of these dynamics, their efforts to mitigate unequal participation seem limited, which raises questions about the representative potential of interest groups and the legitimacy of their policy claims.
Abstract: Interest groups’ potential to enhance democratic representation is often questioned and has rarely been systematically analysed. In this article, we examine interest group accountability, a key component for groups to realize their democratic potential. To do this, we take an organization-centric and top-down perspective and develop a tailored analytical framework including three key dimensions—information, discussion and consequences. Drawing on data from a large-scale survey of interest groups active at the EU level, we find considerable variation in the extent to which groups demonstrate practices related to these three accountability dimensions. Furthermore, while receiving funding from EU institutions does not have any significant effect on interest group accountability, we find that organizations representing businesses interests more frequently develop accountability practices related to the dimensions of discussion and consequences, whereas citizen groups are more focused on the information dimension.
Abstract: Stakeholder engagement is often considered an essential component of regulatory policymaking and governance. Our main aim in this paper is to explain variation in stakeholder engagement across regulatory trajectories. More specifically we aim to assess why some regulatory policymaking processes attract a larger and more diverse set of stakeholders, while others attract much smaller and more homogenous regulatory crowds. We build on a newly established dataset of primary data regarding stakeholder engagement in EU regulatory governance to test our assumptions. We find that both the salience and the number of different consultation instruments affect the density and diversity of stakeholder engagement, whereas the complexity of regulations seems to mainly affect the density of stakeholder engagement. The combination of both institutional and regulation-specific drivers of stakeholder engagement in regulatory governance yields relevant implications for the study of responsive regulation and the role stakeholders can fulfill in regulatory decision-making.
Abstract: Interest groups’ potential to enhance democratic representation is often questioned and has rarely been systematically analysed. In this article, we examine interest group accountability, a key component for groups to realize their democratic potential. To do this, we take an organization-centric and top-down perspective and develop a tailored analytical framework including three key dimensions—information, discussion and consequences. Drawing on data from a large-scale survey of interest groups active at the EU level, we find considerable variation in the extent to which groups demonstrate practices related to these three accountability dimensions. Furthermore, while receiving funding from EU institutions does not have any significant effect on interest group accountability, we find that organizations representing businesses interests more frequently develop accountability practices related to the dimensions of discussion and consequences, whereas citizen groups are more focused on the information dimension.
Abstract: This article examines the extent to which open, closed and hybrid consultation approaches, with the first two, respectively, referring to the use of public and targeted tools, and the third one implying a combination of both of them, relate to the policy engagement of a different set of stakeholders? We identify the different tools used by the European Commission to engage stakeholders in policymaking and assess how variation in consultation approaches relates to stakeholder participation via a descriptive and multivariate analysis. We rely on two datasets: a regulatory database that contains detailed information on 41 EU regulations and a stakeholder database that comprises 2617 stakeholders that were involved in these regulations through different consultation tools. Our main finding is that implementing different consultation approaches affects stakeholder diversity. Specifically, closed consultation approaches lead to a lower level of business dominance than hybrid approaches that combine open and targeted consultation tools.
Abstract: Intergovernmental networks have become a prominent cooperative mechanism to deal with trans-boundary and interdependent problems. Yet, we still have limited knowledge of how these collaborative endeavours are governed, which is crucial to properly understanding how they function. This article empirically examines the structural governance configurations of rule-enforcing networks in the European Union. The article relies on data from 37 networks with rule-enforcing tasks and conducts a qualitative comparative analysis. We find three basic governance structure configurations used by rule-enforcing networks: first, a configuration with legal accountability, which is characterized by having a board of appeals; second, one with administrative accountability that, in addition to a board of appeals, has powerful executive boards and professional experts in the network plenary; and a third one with democratic accountability that incorporates legislative representatives in the network plenary. We argue that these results show how network tasks are related to accountability and governance.
Abstract: The European Commission's outreach to interest groups implies that they function as ‘transmission belts’ that aggregate and articulate interests as policy-relevant information for policy-makers. Operating as a transmission belt, however, requires an organizational design fit for this purpose. We offer one of the first systematic analyses of how organizational design affects interest group access to public officials. We draw from a novel dataset of 248 EU-level interest groups including data on several dimensions of organizational design. One of our key findings is that qualified majority and consensus-facilitating decision-making procedures help interest groups gain access to administrative and political officials, whereas functional differentiation is important to get access to administrative officials, but not to political officials. Our findings thus demonstrate the relevance of organizational design in gaining access as well as the need to incorporate varying informational demands of public officials to properly explain interest group access to public decision-making.
Abstract: Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are considered important intermediaries between citizens and policymakers. They are assumed to function as transmission belts that filter societal preferences and channel them to policymakers. Although the ability of CSOs to connect civil society with policymakers has been put into question, it has rarely been theoretically specified and empirically tested. This paper develops a conceptualization of CSOs that examines their capacity to function as transmission belts. It does so by distinguishing two organizational dimensions related to member involvement and organizational capacity. The paper draws on a large survey of CSOs active at the EU to empirically assess these organizational dimensions and relate them to basic CSOs’ characteristics. The findings indicate that one out of three organizations approximates the ideal-type transmission belt. The findings contribute to a better understanding and assessment of CSO’s potential contribution to policy-making in representative democracies.
Abstract: In this article, we answer the research question “What factors affect the structural complexity of network administrative organizations (NAOs)?” The question warrants further research because of the lack of empirical studies on the topic. We design a quantitative study of the structure of all 37 European regulatory networks. Using Bayesian statistics, we analyze the new data set and test hypotheses, derived from the literature, about the factors affecting the structural complexity of NAOs. We find that networks with rule-setting tasks are strongly related to less complex NAOs, whereas networks with member-sanctioning and rule-enforcing tasks are strongly related to more complex NAOs. Theoretically, network-level tasks appear to affect NAO complexity, particularly given the implied uncertainty of those tasks, as well as the network-level operational requirements related to them.
Abstract: Since the onset of the Great Recession, “doing more with less” has become a policy mantra. To do more with less, a range of governments have concurrently imposed wage cuts and greater work demands on public employees. This article assesses the impact of these changes on the job satisfaction and work motivation of public employees in 34 European countries. Congruent with previous studies linking income and working hours with job attitudes, the article finds a negative impact on both. There are no free austerity lunches: while public employees may work longer hours for lower pay, they are less satisfied and less motivated when doing so. One caveat applies: the effect on motivation—although not satisfaction—is mitigated when employees feel that their values are aligned with those of their organization. This puts a premium on public managers fostering value alignment, particularly when it is hardest to achieve: in times of cutbacks.
Abstract: In understanding what drives the development of network administrative organizations (NAOs) in mandated networks, power bargaining is central. The authors execute a comparative longitudinal case study of NAOs in two policy-mandated networks. The article focuses specifically on the role of power in these developments and concludes that differences in NAO development arise from power dependencies, which are attributable in part to sector characteristics. It is proposed that mandated network members’ greater interdependence and greater dependence on external nonmembers, as well as whole network dependence on external actors, partly determine mandated networks’ NAO design. These networks will have larger and more capable NAOs (with more staff), accept sharing control of the NAO executive with the mandating party, and have broader responsibilities.
Abstract: This article examines “parallel lobbying”, namely when firms lobby public institutions even when associations they are members of are lobbying those same institutions. The article intends to bring new light into this phenomenon by examining the extent to which parallel lobbying occurs at the EU level and, more importantly, unveiling what firm – and association-level characteristics explain why firms exercise parallel lobbying. We rely on large-n dataset of meetings held by companies, associations, and EU public officials between 2014 and 2023. Our findings partially confirm that firm characteristics relate to parallel lobbying. Yet, the occurrence of parallel meetings seems to be mostly driven by association-level features. This study provides new insights into an under-examined phenomenon that affects the quality and legitimacy of our governance systems.
Abstract: This study argues that political participation is a key factor when explaining levels of political trust among citizens. It explores how this relationship is moderated by the socio-economic status (i.e., household income and educational level) of citizens. The article contributes to the field of political trust by employing European Social Survey data from 2016 and 2018. Two findings stand out: firstly, whereas political participation through institutionalized channels is positively related to higher levels of trust among citizens with high socio-economic status, this effect is not present among citizens with lower levels of socio-economic status. Secondly, citizens that highly engage in non-institutionalized modes of political participation and with lower levels of socio-economic status are the ones with lower levels of political trust.
